FORD BRONCO ROLLOVER ACCIDENTS

As a result of the gasoline shortages of the late-1970s, the automotive industry attempted to make its fleet more fuel efficient. Pursuant to governmental regulations and consumer demands, Ford decided to introduce a new compact pickup truck and sports utility vehicle (SUV), the Ranger and the Bronco II, respectively. The Ford Bronco II sometimes referred to as the Ford Bronco ll or Bronco ii Bronco2 was the originator of rollover problem for Ford. In the 1980's and early 1990's the Ford Bronco was at the time the "True Rollover King" in the USA. Ford elected to make the Bronco II a derivative vehicle of the Ranger because only a moderate investment would be required, making the Bronco II more profitable than other alternatives presented. As a derivative vehicle the Bronco II shared the same assembly line with the Ranger and was practically identical from the “B” pillar forward. Bronco II Rollover Information

 60 Minutes AND THE  JEEP CJ ROLLOVER PROBLEM

The popular television program “60 Minutes” aired a segment which described the danger of Jeep rollovers in late 1980 of which Ford was aware, yet it continued to use the CJ- 7 as its developmental model. According to some experts in the field, the tendency to roll over is caused by a low static stability index ("SI"). The SI describes the relationship between a vehicle's track width and the height of the vehicle's center of gravity. The lower the SI, the higher the risk of rolling over. A vehicle with a narrow track and a high center of gravity is more likely to roll.

FORD BRONCO ROLLOVER INDE

In February 1981, Ford engineers offered management five proposals to make the Bronco II more stable. Proposals One and Two involved slight increases in the Bronco II's stability index to 2.02 and 2.03. Proposals Three, Four and Five involved additional widening of the track and lowering of the center of gravity. These changes would result in SIs of 2.09, 2.19, and 2.25, respectively. Proposals One and Two could be completed by the production deadline date for the Bronco II; but Proposals Three, Four, and Five "[could] not be contained within Job #1, 1983 P/U 4x4 timing” because they involved increasing ride height, widening the track, and/or making body revisions. As a result Ford chose to proceed with Proposal Two knowing that the Bronco II would have a stability index of 2.03, worse than that of the CJ-7 at 2.04. In addition to an automobile's stability index, its tendency to roll over is governed by the amount of understeer or oversteer and its sensitivity to steering inputs. Ford added a front stabilizer bar to the Bronco in order to increase the Bronco II's roll stiffness, hoping to increase the amount of its understeer. When equipped with a front stabilizer bar the Bronco II was an understeer vehicle, but when it approached its cornering limit, the Bronco II became an oversteer vehicle. After adding a front stabilizer bar, Ford performed only subjective tests to evaluate the bar, without performing objective tests such as limit maneuvers or lane change testing.

FORD BRONCO II - TWIN I-BEAM SUSPENSION

 Another factor affecting the Bronco II's stability was Ford's use of the twin I-beam (swing-axle) suspension. Swing axles have a tendency to “jack” because lateral forces on the tire tend to push the axle up. Jacking has two effects: (1) the tires will move inward under the vehicle, causing the vehicle to become narrower, and (2) the front of the vehicle moves up, making the vehicle taller. As a result, stability decreases instantaneously. Jacking causes the Bronco II to jump up or “spike,” when the vehicle experiences lateral forces of about. Ford knew about the jacking problem associated with the twin I-beam suspension. The engineering department published a paper as early as 1965 warning that in smaller vehicles twin I-beams created jacking during

 Ford did have safer choices, and its own engineers recommended the use of a MacPherson strut which lowers the center of gravity. However, the executive in charge of making the suspension decision elected to go with the twin I-beam as a result of pressures from his superiors. Ford also sought additional marketing advantages available with the twin I-beam.After the decision to go with Proposal Two had been made, Ford built a mechanical prototype of the Bronco II using the Jeep CJ-7 as its image vehicle and making the Proposal Two modifications. Ford then scheduled extensive testing of the mechanical prototype. As a result of the testing, Ford engineers reported that the Bronco II's track needed to be widened or its ride height lowered.
After the mechanical prototype testing, Ford built engineering prototypes. Initially, the prototypes were tested with the vehicle performing J-turns of up to 55 m.p.h. and 360 degrees of steer.The vehicle would tip over at speeds as low as 30 m.p.h. Id. Ford's engineers tried a combination of different suspensions, tires, and steering designs in an attempt to stabilize the Bronco II. Id. By mid-March 1982, development engineers again reported that to improve the problem of rollovers, the track width had to be increased by three to four inches.

In April 1982, Ford scheduled a meeting to review a track-widening proposal and to “develop a contingency plan which will not delay Job # 1.”  The engineers concluded that a 2-inch increase in track width was the minimum required for a minor improvement in stability.A significant improvement in J-turn handling could be achieved on a Bronco II by using 14-inch wheels or increasing track-width 3 to 4 inches. Neither of these recommendations was ever implemented. Even modest increases of two inches were rejected by Ford because “even with 110% effort, Job #1 would be in serious jeopardy.”  Eight months from the commencement of Job #1, the engineers once again recommended increasing the track by two inches which would have delayed Job #1 by three months. These recommendations were necessitated by the results of a test conducted on track during May 1982 at the Arizona Proving Grounds. The test drivers experienced the prototypes tipping up onto two wheels, outriggers failing, and vehicles pole-vaulting over. In fact live J-turn testing was halted because it was too dangerous for the engineers and test drivers. Ford did not resume live J-turn testing until May 1989, six years after production of the Bronco II had commenced.   Ford implemented several superficial changes in order to increase the Bronco II's stability, including adding weight below the center of gravity, adding sealant to the tires, and changing the wheels. Ford did not make any major changes because they required widening the track or removing the twin I-beam.Both of which were costly and would have delayed production. 

 By placing the Bronco II on the market, Ford failed to meet its own design criteria. Ford's design goals for the Bronco II were the following:
1.    Extremely safe;
2.    Reduce rollover propensity to minimum including panic situations;
3.    Avoid (virtually preclude) over correction in accident avoidance maneuvers;
4.    Remain stable at all speeds under maximum steering inputs per human factors analysis;
5.    Respond safely to large steering inputs which are typical of accident avoidance or emergency maneuvers; and
6.    Handling and stability equal or better than any vehicle in class.
 The vast majority of vehicles will not roll over or tip-up during J-turns and emergency avoidance maneuvers.

FORD BRONCO II CENTER OF ATTENTION WITH NHTSA

Although the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) has never promulgated rollover resistance standards, it has investigated defects which contribute to a propensity for rollover. The NHTSA conducted a defect investigation of the Bronco II from late 1988 until October 1990. In September 1988 NHTSA requested information from Ford concerning the Bronco II. Ford acknowledges that it was supposed to provide information that answered questions posed by NHTSA but indicated it “didn't notice that [NHTSA] delineated development testing.” 

    The NHTSA requested that Ford:        
    [f]urnish the number and copies of all owner reports, . . . investigations, memoranda,and other records from all sources either received or authorized by Ford, or which Ford is otherwise aware, pertaining to:

 (a) rollover, stability or similar performance or

 (b) the subject alleged defects of the Bronco II . . .

 (c) any information Ford may have comparing the Bronco II's stability factor (center of gravity height) with other motor vehicles.

    Identify the parties involved and describe any and all tests and analyses at (1) Ford, . . . or subject alleged defects, or (b) used to establish the stability of the Bronco II. . . . Furnish copies of all reports, notes, tables, graphs, film, photographs, or similar documentation which were developed for each.Ford asserted that it believed the Spring 1982 APG testing did not have to be submitted to the NHTSA. Robert Munson, Ford's representative responsible for responding to the NHTSA and Jeffrey Miller, then NHTSA chief counsel and current lobbyist for the automobile industry, confirmed that Ford sent the NHTSA production testing but did not submit the APG live limits testing. The NHTSA neither conducted tests of its own nor questioned Ford about the documents produced. After considering Ford's response alone, the NHTSA issued a closing report on October 31, 1990, stating there appears no reasonable expectation that further investigation would lead to a determination of the existence of a safety-related defect with respect to any of the allegations regarding the propensity of the Bronco II to rollover.

    After the Bronco II was put on the market, Ernest Grush, Ford's automotive safety office statistician, acknowledged that he met with representatives of Consumer Union (“CU”) in April 1989 to discuss Bronco II accident data. CU was contemplating publishing a report about the Bronco II's instability. A day after this meeting, Jerry Sloan, another Ford representative, authored a memorandum reporting on the meeting, stating that Ford visited with CU to “moderat[e] what might otherwise be a totally disastrous story.”. Sloan's memorandum reported that Ford had “clouded their [Consumer Union's] minds, loosened some conclusions, . . . and sent them off to search for additional information which may work to our advantage.”

If you or a member of your family has been involved in a  Ford Bronco rollover, SUV rollovers, truck rollovers, van rollover accidents and 15 passenger van rollover accidents or  any other serious accident  and you have questions about whether the vehicle design may caused or contributed to the accident or injuries, then call and talk to us now. Call  1-800-883-9858 for a Free & Confidential Consultation or Click Here

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Mr. Willis has represented clients in personal injury, auto accident, suv  rollover, van & truck rollovers and other product liability and negligence cases from across the United States, including clients from Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin & West Virginia.   

 

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